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SUMMARY: The paper shows how analyses assuming perfect competition can yield a distorted estima-
tion of the expected effects of a trade liberalization when market imperfections exist. The analytical frame-
work adopted is very simple and three extreme imperfect market structures are considered. In the first case,
the exporting country maximizes its producer and consumer surplus by intervening in the world market.
The second market imperfection considered is the existence of a private firm playing the role of «pure
middleman» in the world market. Then the case of a producer-owned marketing board which is granted ex-
clusive export authority is addressed. It is shown that estimates of the impact of a tariff reduction in terms
of prices and volume traded obtained assuming perfect competition when this postulate does not hold, are
distorted. When domestic demand and supply functions are assumed to be linear, the impact is overestima-
ted; a ranking of the size of such distortions in the three cases analyzed is provided. When no restriction is
imposed on the demand and supply functions, the error in the estimated impact of a tariff reduction invol-
ves the magnitude as well as the sign of the expected changes in prices and volume traded. Finally, it is
proved that when a private firm exerts monopoly and monopsony power in the world market, both the im-
porting and the exporting countries may well be better off if, rather than making a move towards trade libe-
ralization, the importing country «compensates» the exporting country by means of a direct transfer.
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RESUMEN: El artículo muestra cómo los análisis que incorporan el supuesto de competencia perfecta
pueden proporcionar una estimación distorsionada de los efectos esperados de una liberalización del co-
mercio en presencia de imperfecciones de mercado. Adoptando un marco analítico muy sencillo, se con-
sideran tres casos extremos de imperfecciones de mercado. En el primero, el país exportador maximiza
los excedentes del productor y  consumidor interviniendo en el mercado mundial. El segundo es el caso
de una empresa privada que desempeña en el mercado mundial un papel de «intermediario puro». El úl-
timo trata de una junta de comercialización, propiedad de productores que han conseguido derechos ex-
clusivos de exportación. En este trabajo se demuestra la existencia de una desviación de las estimaciones
del impacto de una reducción de aranceles sobre los precios y el volumen comercializado cuando en el
análisis se supone competencia perfecta y dicho supuesto no se cumple. Además si las funciones de de-
manda y oferta domésticas son lineales, el impacto precedente queda sobreestimado. Asimismo, en el
trabajo se presenta una ordenación de la magnitud de dichas desviaciones para cada uno de los tres casos
analizados. Cuando no se impone ninguna restricción sobre las funciones de demanda y oferta, el error
de estimación afecta tanto a la magnitud como al signo de los cambios esperados en precios y volumen
comercializado, como consecuencia de una reducción de aranceles. Finalmente, se demuestra que,
cuando una empresa privada ejerce un poder de monopolio y de monopsonio en el mercado mundial,
tanto los países importadores como los exportadores pueden beneficiarse si, en lugar de inclinarse hacia
la liberalización del comercio, el país importador «compensa» al país exportador mediante una transfe-
rencia directa.
PALABRAS CLAVE: liberalización del comercio; mercados imperfectos; monopolio; monopsonio;
junta de comercialización.
Clasificación JEL: F12; F13; Q17; Q18. 
Mainly as a result of the Uruguay round of the GATT, since the late 1980s there
has been a marked increase in the literature pertaining to the effects produced by libe-
ralizing agricultural trade (Anania, 2001). Most empirical analyses assume perfect
competition in both domestic and international markets. However, international agri-
cultural trading occurs in markets where the holders of market power are particularly
active. The need to give more attention to the existence of imperfectly competitive
domestic market structures when analyzing agricultural and food policy changes is
well discussed in McCorriston (2002). 
This paper investigates the effects of a trade liberalization assuming imperfect
competition in world markets and compares the results with those obtained under the
hypothesis that perfect competition occurs. Three extreme imperfect market structu-
res are analyzed in a very simple analytical framework. Though the aim of the paper
is clearly explorative, its findings do in fact provide some useful indications regar-
ding the distortions which result from assuming perfect competition in cases where
this hypothesis does not hold.
In the first section, the relevance of market imperfections in agricultural world
trade is briefly discussed. The two-country model described in the second section
combines both a graphical and algebraic approach in assessing the impact of a trade
liberalization in three imperfect world market scenarios: i) when the exporting
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surplus; ii) when a firm exists in the international market acting as a «pure middle-
man» which maximizes its own profits; and iii) when a producer-owned marketing
board is granted exclusive authority to export. The last section gives a summary of
the principal results obtained.
Agricultural Trade and Imperfect Markets
Almost all countries, and in particular the major traders, do, in one way or anot-
her, intervene in international markets. In many countries, whether importing or ex-
porting, developed or developing, effective marketing boards and State Trading En-
terprises (STEs) exist (Ackerman and Dixit, 1999; Veeman, Fulton and Larue, 1999).
Examples include the Canadian Wheat Board, the Australian Wheat Board, the Japa-
nese Food Agency, the New Zealand Dairy Board, as well as many STEs active in de-
veloping countries.
Around about the beginning of the 1990s, 80% of world cereals exports was con-
trolled by just six multinational firms, while four firms controlled 80% of the trade in
oilseeds; if commodities exported by developing countries are also considered, there
is no significant change in the market concentration: four firms controlled 60% of the
trade in sugar; three 80% of that in tea (Scoppola, 2000, p. 64).
The effects of different market imperfections on international agricultural
trade have been analysed both from theoretical and empirical points of view1.
Market imperfections can affect the impact of a trade liberalization on prices, vo-
lume traded and welfare. Since current WTO negotiations are likely to bring about
a significant reduction in the barriers to agricultural trading, it is of interest to as-
certain whether or not the attempts to evaluate the effects of an agricultural trade
liberalization which assume perfect competition are biased, and the direction of
such bias.
The analytical framework
A very simple partial equilibrium framework with one commodity, two large
countries, and zero transportation costs has been used in developing the analysis. It is
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1 Theoretical analyses include those by Bieri and Schmitz, 1974; Dixit and Josling, 1997; Just, Sch-
mitz and Zilbermann, 1979; McCalla, 1966; McCalla and Josling, 1985; McCorriston and MacLaren,
2000; Sarris and Schmitz, 1981; Schmitz, McCalla, Mitchell and Carter, 1981; and Veeman, Fulton and
Larue, 1999. Empirical analyses, involving a wide range of market imperfections, have been carried out,
among the others, by Abbott, 1979; Alaouze, Watson and Sturgess, 1978; Carter and Schmitz, 1979; Car-
ter and Smith, 2001; Francois, McDonald and Nordstrom, 1996; Hertel, Brockmeier and Swaminathan,
1997; Karp and McCalla, 1983; Kawaguchi, Suzuki and Kaiser, 1997; Kolstad and Burris, 1986; Lanclos,
Hertel and Devadoss, 1996; McCorriston, 1996; Paarlberg and Abbott, 1986; Pick and Park, 1991; Sch-
mitz, McCalla, Mitchell and Carter, 1981; Swaminathan, Hertel and Brockmeier, 1997; Thursby and
Thursby, 1990; and Warr, 2001.
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to simplify the analysis, supply and demand functions are assumed to be linear; the
implications for the results obtained of removing this assumption are discussed in the
final part of the paper. 
Country A is a tariff-imposing importing country and country B the exporting
country.
Let XA(q) and XB(q) be the inverse excess demand and supply functions of coun-
tries A and B respectively, q being the volume of trade, with ∂ XA/∂ q = XA’<  0 ,
∂ XB/∂ q = XB’> 0. 
Let us first derive the effects produced by a trade liberalization in the «reference»
scenario, i.e. where perfect competition prevails in all markets. This particular case is
shown in figure 1, where XA is the inverse excess demand of A, XB is the inverse ex-
cess supply of B, and t = AB is the per unit import tariff. XA’’ is the tariff-inclusive
excess demand of A expressed as function of the price in the exporting country. When
A imposes the tariff, the volume of trade is qPC/t ,A ’s domestic price is PA
PC/t , and B’s
is PB
PC/t . The shaded areas represent the «gains from trade» of A and B, i.e. the incre-
ases in the closed-economy producer and consumer surplus due to international tra-
ding (assuming that the tariff revenue is redistributed to producers and consumers in
country A as a lump sum transfer). If a trade liberalization takes place, the volume of
trade increases to qPC and the price in the two countries equals PPC .
The market equilibrium condition under perfect competition is given by:















PC / t q
PC 
quantity
Figura 1. Perfect competition.
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XA’dq – dt – XB’dq = 0 [2]
The impact on prices and volume traded of a tariff change can be described as fo-
llows:
[dq/dt]PC = 1 / [XA’– X B’] < 0 [3]
[dPA/dt]PC = XA’dq/dt > 0, and [4]
[dPB/dt]PC = XB’dq/dt < 0 [5]
where Pi is the equilibrium price in country i.
The producer and consumer surpluses of A and B are given by:
WA = WA
AUT +  
q
0
XA(z) dz – q [XA(q) – t] [6]
WB = WB






AUT are the closed-economy consumer and producer surpluses
of countries A and B, respectively, and the remaining terms in [6] and [7] are the
«gains from trade». The welfare effects of a tariff change are given by:
[dWA/dt]PC = [t – q XA’] dq/dt + q , and [8]
[dWB/dt]PC = q XB’dq/dt < 0 [9]
While the welfare of the tariff-imposing country will, in general, either increase
or decrease as the tariff decreases, the welfare of the exporting country will definitely
increase.
Case I: the exporting country maximizing its producer and
consumer surplus
The first case of market imperfection to be discussed is where the exporting
country (country B) intervenes in order to maximize its consumer and producer sur-
plus, which is assumed to include the export tax revenue, redistributed to consumers
and producers as a lump sum transfer.
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ma
q
x WB = WB




Hence, the volume traded which maximizes WB and the optimal export tax are
such that
∂ WB /∂ q = XA(q) – t + q XA’– X B(q) = 0 , and  [11]
τ = –q XA’ [12]
B maximizes its consumer and producer surplus by exporting up to the point
where its marginal export revenue [XA(q) – t + q XA’] equals its marginal export so-
cial cost [XB(q)]. The marginal export social cost is defined as the sum of the domes-
tic consumer welfare losses and the increase in producer costs which result from a
marginal increase in exports. In figure 2 the marginal export revenue curve of B when
A imposes an import tariff is given by XA
**; the equilibrium condition [11] is satisfied
in point E. The volume of trade is qMS/t, the prices in countries A and B are respecti-
vely given by PA
MS/t ,a n d  P B
MS/t . The import tariff of A is GH and the export tariff of
B is equal to HE.
If A unilaterally eliminates its import tariff, the marginal export revenue curve of
country B becomes XA
* ; the equilibrium condition is now satisfied in D. The volume
































XA * XA **
Figura 2. The exporting country maximizing its producer and consumer surplus.
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When the exporting country exercises market power to maximize its producer
and consumer surplus, an elimination of the tariff by the importing country has a
smaller impact in terms of the changes both in prices (PB
MS PB
MS/t is less than PPC
PB
PC/t ,a nd PA
MS PA
MS/t is less than PPC PA
PC/t ), and in the volume of trade (qMS/t qMS is
less than qPC/t qPC). This is because the marginal export revenue curves of country B
(XA
*and XA
**) are steeper than the excess demand curves of country A in the two sce-
narios (XA and XA’’).
The same result can be proved by taking the total differential of [11]. By doing so,
under the assumption that the excess demand and supply functions are linear, we obtain:
[dq/dt]MS = 1 / [2 XA’– X B’] < 0 [13]
and the following condition holds:
0 > [dq/dt]MS > [dq/dt]PC [14]
from whence:
[dPA/dt]PC > [dPA/dt]MS > 0 , and [15]
0 > [dPB/dt]MS > [dPB/dt]PC [16]
Hence, when the exporting country exerts market power to maximize its producer
and consumer surplus, a movement toward trade liberalization by the importing
country has a smaller impact on prices and volume traded than it would do when per-
fect competition obtains.
Case II: the «pure middleman» case
The second imperfect market structure involves the case where a private firm acts
as an international intermediary between the two countries; we assume the very ex-
treme situation where it exerts both monopoly and monopsony power in the world
market, while domestic markets remain perfectly competitive and the two countries
do not intervene.
Assuming that transaction costs are nil, the profit maximization problem of the
firm can be stated as follows:
ma
q
x π = q [XA(q) – t – XB(q)] [17]
The volume traded will be such that
∂π /∂ q = XA(q) – t – XB(q) + q XA’– q XB’= 0 [18]
The firm maximizes its profits by buying from B and selling to A a quantity such
that its marginal revenue equals its marginal cost. This case is shown in figure 3,
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where X**
A is the firm marginal revenue and X*
B is its marginal cost. Equilibrium
condition [18] is satisfied in C; the volume traded is now equal to qPM/t,p rices in A
and B equal PA
PM/t and PB
PM/t , and the firm per unit profit equals HE. If A eliminates
the tariff, the firm’s marginal cost becomes X*
A and the equilibrium condition is satis-
fied in point F; the volume of trade increases to qPM, country A’s price becomes PA
PM,
country B’s PB
PM, and the firm per unit profit DM, which is greater than HE, the per

































Figura 3. The «pure middleman» case.
The price and volume of trade changes due to a trade liberalization in this case
are smaller than those occurring under perfect competition, and are also smaller than
those occurring when the exporting country exerts market power to maximize its pro-
ducer and consumer surplus. This is because i) the marginal revenue curve of the firm
is steeper than the excess demand curve of A, and ii) the marginal cost curve is stee-
per than the excess supply curve of B.
These results can be easily proved by using some algebra. By taking the total dif-
ferential of [18] we obtain:
[dq/dt]PM = 1/ [2 (XA’– X B’)] < 0 , and  [19]
0 > [dq/dt]PM > [dq/dt]MS > [dq/dt]PC ,f rom whence [20]
[dPA/dt]PC > [dPA/dt]MS > [dPA/dt]PM > 0 [21]
0 > [dPB/dt]PM > [dPB/dt]MS > [dPB/dt]PC [22]
Cap  01-Anania  Giovanni    18/11/04    16:40    Página  12Gains from trade liberalization with imperfectly competitive world markets. A note 13
As one can expect, the profits of the firm acting as a «pure middleman» in the
market will always increase as the importing country reduces the tariff:
[dπ /dt] = [XA(q) – t – XB(q)] dq/dt – 1/2 < 0 [23]
If we think of the overall welfare as the sum of (a) producer and consumer surplus
in the importing country, assuming that tariff revenue is redistributed among them
(WA), (b) producer and consumer surplus in the exporting country (WB), and (c) the
profits of the «pure middleman», the impact of a tariff reduction on the welfare of
country B is given by:
[dWB/dt]PM = q XB’dq/dt < 0 , with [24]
0 > [dWB/dt]PM > [dWB/dt]PC [25]
Hence, when a firm acting as a «pure middleman» in the world market exists, a
trade liberalization has an impact on the exporting country’s welfare smaller than that
which would occur in a perfect competition scenario.
Finally, producers and consumers, as a whole, in both countries might well be
better off if, rather than abolishing the tariff,A were to compensate B through a direct
welfare transfer. This is the case, for example, of the specific market represented in fi-
gure 3, where country A’s losses due to the trade liberalization (area PA
PMNHI minus
area LMN) are in fact greater than country B’s gains (area PB
PMDEpB
PM/t). Hence,
both countries would be better off if A, rather than eliminating the tariff, were to
compensate B with a direct welfare transfer greater than PB
PMDEpB
PM/t and less than
PA
PMNHI minus LMN.
The necessary and sufficient condition whereby consumers and producers, as a
whole, in the two countries are both better off when A, rather than eliminating the ta-
riff, directly compensates B by means of a proper welfare transfer, is given by:
d[WA + WB] / dt  > 0 , or [26]
q > [XA(q) – XB(q)] / [2 (XB’– X A’)] [27]
Case III: a producer-owned marketing board with exclusive
export authority
The third imperfect market structure considered is that where in the exporting
country a producer-owned marketing board has been granted exclusive export autho-
rity; this allows the marketing board to exert market power in the world market
(while domestic markets remain perfectly competitive).
Let Q be the quantity produced in country B and SB(Q) the inverse domestic
supply function, with ∂ SB/∂ Q = SB’> 0. In equilibrium,
PB = XB(q) = SB(Q) [28]
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From [28] the quantity produced in country B as a function of the quantity expor-
ted can be derived:
Q(q) = S–1
B [ XB(q) ] , with  [29]
0 ≤ Q’=  ∂ Q /∂ q ≤ 1 2 [30]
Being the marketing board owned by country B’s producers, we assume that it
acts with the goal of maximizing their profits3. Hence, the problem faced by the mar-
keting board can be stated as follows:
ma
q
x Γ  = q [XA(q) – t – XB(q)] + XB(q) Q(q) –  
Q(q)
0
SB(z) dz – FC [31]
where the four addenda in [31] are, respectively: the profits made by the marketing
board; producer revenue; variable and fixed production costs. It is assumed that the
marketing board pays producers the domestic market equilibrium price and distribu-
tes its profits to its owners, producers in country B. 
The volume exported by the marketing board which will maximize producer pro-
fits will be such that
∂Γ /∂ q = XA(q) – t – XB(q) + q XA’– q XB’+ X B’Q(q) = 0 [32]
The marketing board maximizes producer profits by exporting to country A a
quantity such that producer marginal revenue equals marginal cost. This case is
shown in figure 4, where gross producer profits (i.e. profits plus fixed production
costs) are given by the sum of the shaded areas. The equilibrium condition given in
[32] is satisfied in point D, where XA
** is [XA(q) – t + qXA’] and XB
** is [XB(q) + q
XB’– X B’Q(q)]. XB
**intercept and slope are both smaller than those of XB
* , the mar-
ginal revenue curve of the profit maximizing private firm considered in the previous
case.4 In figure 5 the market equilibrium when A eliminates the tariff is represented.
The equilibrium condition is satisfied in point C; volume of trade increases to qMB,
prices in the two countries become PA
MB and PB
MB,p roduction in country B expands
to QMB and the per unit profit of the marketing board to EC (from HD).
2 A change of the volume exported is always associated to a smaller change, in the same direction,
of the quantity produced; in fact, an increase (decrease) in the quantity exported is equal to the sum of the
increase (decrease) in domestic production and the reduction (increase) in domestic consumption, taken
in absolute values. 
3 Different hypotheses have been made with respect to the objective pursued by a marketing board,
including maximizing sales, producer revenues and their own revenues (Sexton and Lavoie, 2001). Alt-
hough all these hypotheses appear to be justified under specific circumstances, a producer-owned marke-
ting board maximizing producer profits seems to us to represent the most general case.  
4 While the intercept of XB
** is always smaller than that of XB, the excess supply function of
country B, no ranking of the slopes of the two functions is, in general, possible; this means that, diffe-
rently from the case depicted in figure 4, XB and XB
** could intersect. However, this does not affect the re-
sults derived.
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The price and volume of trade changes due to a trade liberalization are in this
case smaller than those occurring under perfect competition or when the exporting
country exerts market power to maximize its producer and consumer surplus, and lar-
ger than those which occur when a private firm exists which is able to act as a «pure
middleman» on the world market. In fact, by taking the total differential of [32], and
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Figura 5. Trade liberalization in the presence of a producer-owned marketing board.
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[dq/dt]MB = 1/ [2 (XA’– X B’) + XB’Q’] < 0 , from whence [33]
0 > [dq/dt]PM > [dq/dt]MB > [dq/dt]MS > [dq/dt]PC [34]
[dPA/dt]PC > [dPA/dt]MS > [dPA/dt]MB > [dPA/dt]PM > 0 [35]
0 > [dPB/dt]PM > [dPB/dt]MB > [dPB/dt]MS > [dPB/dt]PC [36]
Producer profits in the exporting country increase as the importing country redu-
ces the tariff:
[dΓ /dt] = dq/dt [XA(q) – t – XB(q)] + XB’dq/dt [Q(q) – q] + q [XA’dq/dt – 1] < 0 5 [37]
while the welfare of country B always increases when a tariff reduction takes place:
[dWB/dt]MB = dq/dt [XA(q) – t – XB(q)] + q [XA’dq/dt – 1] < 0 [38]
What if the demand and supply functions are not linear?
So far it has been assumed that domestic demand and supply functions - and, as a
consequence, excess demand and supply functions - are linear. We will now briefly
discuss the implications of this assumption for the results derived above. 
Let us consider the impact of a tariff reduction on the volume of trade. If the as-
sumption on the linearity of the demand and supply functions is removed, [3] above
is unaffected, while  [13], [19] and [33] become, respectively:
[dq/dt]MS = 1 / [2 XA’– X B’+ q XA’’ ] [39]
[dq/dt]PM = 1/ [2 (XA’– X B’) + q (XA’’ – XB’’) ] [40]
[dq/dt]MB = 1/ [2 (XA’– X B’) + XB’Q’+ q XA’’ + XB’’ (Q – q) ] [41]
with XA’’ = ∂ 2XA/∂ q2 and  XB’’ = ∂ 2XB/∂ q2
Not surprisingly, the results derived in the paper under the assumption that the de-
mand and supply functions are linear now hold only under specific conditions. 
This is true even for results one would intuitively think  they would hold under
very general conditions. When the demand and supply functions are linear dq/dt is al-
ways negative (the volume of trade increases when a tariff reduction occurs, no mat-
ter what the market structure is). However, when demand and supply functions are
not restricted to be linear this result still holds under perfect competition, but this is
no more always the case in the other three market structures considered above. In
5 Note that XA’dq/dt is always smaller than 1.
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usual assumption regarding the convexity of the inverse domestic demand and supply
functions (which implies the convexity of the inverse excess demand and supply
functions, i.e. XA’’> 0 and XB’’> 0). 
This means that, when demand and supply functions are not linear, assuming per-
fectly competitive world markets when they are not may induce a distortion of the es-
timated impact of a trade liberalization which involves not only the magnitude of the
impact, but the direction of the expected changes as well. 
[39], [40] and [41] depend on the volume of trade, the first and the second deriva-
tives of the excess demand and supply functions at the equilibrium; these differ in the
four scenarios considered, making it impossible to derive under reasonably general
conditions relative rankings of the bias in the estimates of the impact of a trade libe-
ralization obtained assuming perfectly competitive world markets when they are not.
Finally, it is still possible that consumers and producers, as a whole, in the two
countries are both better off when A, rather than eliminating the tariff, directly com-
pensates B by means of a proper welfare transfer. The necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for this to be true now becomes:
q > [ q (XA’– X B’) – t] / [2 (XA’– X B’) + q (XA’’ – XB’’)] [42]
Conclusions
The aim of the paper was to investigate how the effects of an agricultural trade li-
beralization change when market imperfections are present. Three extreme cases
have been considered within a very simple analytical framework: the first involves an
exporting country which intervenes to maximize its producer and consumer surplus,
the second describes the situation where all international trading is controlled by one
firm acting as a «pure middleman», whereas the third considers the existence of a
producer-owned marketing board which is given exclusive export authority.
The results reached show that estimates of the impact of a tariff reduction in
terms of prices and volume traded obtained assuming perfect competition when this
postulate does not hold, are distorted. When domestic demand and supply functions
are assumed to be linear the impact is overestimated. When no restriction is imposed
on the demand and supply functions, the distortion of the estimated impact of the ta-
riff reduction involves both the magnitude and the sign of the expected changes in
prices and volume traded.
In addition, it has been proved that, when there exists a firm exerting both mono-
poly and monopsony power in the world market, it could well be that a system of di-
rect transfers makes all countries better off with respect to a trade liberalization.
Because of a) the relevance of market imperfections in many internationally traded
agricultural commodities, b) the fact that perfect competition is assumed in most of the
attempts to measure the effects of a reduction in the barriers to agricultural trade, and
c) the significant impact that such attempts may have on the on-going WTO negotia-
tions, it would appear that the results of this paper might be of some interest.
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number of imperfect market structures, and a more realistic analytical setting. In spite
of all the limitations of the present paper, its findings suggest caution at the bargai-
ning table when evaluating the results of the simulations which assume that perfect
competition obtains.
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